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In Asia, there is an argument among the literature that the rise of China is causing 
a split in the region’s security and economic hierarchy. China is a growing potential 
superpower, and it is providing economic incentives towards states traditionally allied 
with the United States. This paper’s research focus is aimed at looking at the alliance 
maintenance of the non-major powers in Asia, and how they react to two contesting great 
powers that provide different incentives. The hypothesis of this paper is that the 
economic condition of a state affects with whom these non-major powers strengthen their 
relationship with. A formal model was constructed to portray how economic conditions 
affect the choice of alliance maintenance when paired with the perception of external 
threat. A critical case comparison was used to test this hypothesis using the cases of 
Japan and the Philippines. The analysis supported the hypothesis. A state’s economic 
condition, coupled with perception of external threat, affects its alliance maintenance in a 
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 The United States became the lone superpower when the Soviet Union imploded. 
However, this position as the single dominant power in the global system is now being 
challenged. China has experienced an explosive economic growth that has caused 
speculation on its potential superpower status. Stuck in the middle of these two giants are 
the middle and minor powers of the Asia Pacific, most of whom are military allies with 
the United States. Eyes are now upon these states to see how they act, when they are 
faced with a choice between their military ally, and the new rising economic power. 
Maintaining an alliance with the United States will ensure their Security; however, 
strengthening their alliance with China will produce more economic benefits at the cost 
of lower security. The first question becomes: “how do middle and minor powers react 
towards the shift of great powers in East Asia?” The literature maintains that alliance 
management and threat perception cause alliances to be maintained, but certain states 
within Asia that are affected by these variables still seek to strengthen relationships with 
China. The question is: why?  
Two cases within the region represent opposite spectrums. Japan has remained a 
steadfast ally of the United States from the end of the Cold war. The Philippines 
continuously flips between strengthening their relationship with China and strengthening 
their relationship with the United States. This inconsistency presents a puzzle. The 
literature argues that states will strengthen their alliance relationships in the presence of 
increasing external threat, yet the Philippines has chosen to weaken its alliance with 
America in the context of China routinely using its force to threaten the Philippines in the 
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South China Sea. What explains the Philippines’ actions? Why would a minor power that 
is routinely threatened by a more powerful state choose to weaken its alliance in lieu of 
strengthening its relationship with the threatening power?  The literature is lacking in 
useful explanations for this occurrence, and thus this paper seeks to fill that gap of 
knowledge. The research question being asked is: what determines how these non-great 
powers in Asia decide between strengthening their relationship with the United States or 
with China?  
 Using the Philippines and Japan as two cases, the biggest difference between 
these two powers which might explain the difference in behavior is their economic 
strength. Japan is a major economic power, and the Philippines is a poor developing state. 
When looking at preliminary information, it seems that economic conditions correlate 
with these countries choices in relationships. Japan is a dominant economic power in the 
system, and has been steadfast with the United States in its alliance. The Philippines 
routinely experiences threat from China, and yet episodically works to improve its 
relationship with the growing power even with the history of aggression. The 
hypothesized reason for this anomaly is the economic conditions of the statey. Those 
poor states will be more willing to gain economic benefits at the expense of security. 
Rich states will prefer security benefits at the expense of economic benefits.  
This paper will be broken up into four parts. The first part will be a discussion of 
the concepts being discussed in the literature. Part two will be the presentation of a 
formal model to portray the importance of the economic conditions within the 
relationship. Part three will discuss the mixed methods approach that the research paper 
applies to the research question. Part four reviews the two case studies used, and applies 
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the critical case analysis to highlight how economics may affect how these states act in 
between two great powers.   
 
Theory/Literature Review  
Alliances 
 The research question deals with alliance commitments of non-great powers to the 
current super power, and how those alliance commitments stand in the test of 
oppositional incentives. To answer the research question requires a thorough 
understanding on the literature of alliances, “middle powers,” and the geo-political 
condition of Asia. This literature will then be applied to the context of the two cases 
showing the variables that affect Japan and the Philippines’ alliance commitments, while 
also highlighting the shortfalls currently in the literature.  
Military alliances require insecurity. There must be some measure of insecurity 
for a state to consider sharing the burden of protection for another state. Alliances can 
help to ameliorate those insecurities. A military alliance is defined as “a formal (or 
informal) commitment for security cooperation between two or more states, intended to 
augment each member’s power, security, and or influence” (Walt 2009). States seek their 
security and their safety, and thus act to assure it. There are two ways a state can work to 
strengthen its own power. The first is internal strengthening through increasing both 
defense spending and military capability; the second, more immediate way of increasing 
security is through an alliance (Morrow 1993). The method of alliance formation to 
increase security is a quicker method of security strengthening as opposed to the slow and 
potentially uncertain internal strengthening. Classically, Balance of Power theory (BOP) 
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and the neo-realist literature argues that states form alliances as counters to the threat of 
great powers (Mearsheimer 2001). Alliances exist long enough to serve their purpose of 
checking expanding great powers and providing for the security of its members. When 
the great power no longer represents a threat, the alliance dissolves and reforms based on 
the next power relationship of the international system. At their most basic function, 
alliances are pure military defense commitments. A threat is produced, and the members 
come forward to provide military support. Walt (1987) altered this theory to show that 
alliances ally against the biggest threat, not the biggest power, as those two are not one in 
the same. This theory of threat is helpful in answering part of the research question, but is 
insufficient in whole to explain the actions of the Philippines. 
This paradigm of alliance formation and dissolution has proven to be inaccurate in 
the real world. Alliances are military institutions, and the literature on institutions has 
shown that they have an ability to survive the original reason of their formation. The 
survival of NATO for a quarter of a century after the fall of the Soviet Union provides a 
counterexample to the dissolution theory. Explanations for this phenomenon range across 
the literature. There are institutionalists who argue that institutions naturally outlive their 
original purpose (Boettke et al. 2008). Constructivists argue that alliances provide more 
value than just a military commitment in the form of socializing states to be more 
cooperative within the system, and are thus valuable to keep in place (Finnemore 1993). 
Oppositely, Bennett (1997) finds a host of causal variables for alliance longevity, but 
finds no support for institutional perpetuity. McCalla (1996) Further supports the lack of 
evidence for institutional perpetuity, but he does provide support for alliances existing for 
longer periods of time when they experience high levels of organization with a strong 
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central leader. Alliances can be extended, but eventually they will all dissolve. De Castro 
(2001) finds that alliance management – the active upkeep of relations between both 
partners through continued talks, exercises, and agreements – contributes to the long-
lasting nature of alliances. Both arguments employ models that find support for their 
assertions, and ultimately, a greater number of explanatory variables are needed to 
provide a more realistic picture.  
Alliance formation is not 100 percent efficient. Snyder (1984) presents a game 
theory model that analyzes security dilemma induced alliance formation. States that are 
insecure decide to form alliances, and then decide how much they are willing to commit 
to those alliances. This continued commitment is based on four criteria: the state’s need 
for assistance in a war, the partner’s capacity to supply assistance, the state’s degree of 
conflict and tension, and the state’s realignment alternatives. States form alliances that 
they believe they will commit to, and thus add weight to the threat of the security 
regime’s capability. A change in any of these variables will alter the likelihood of success 
for alliance formation. States with a smaller need for assistance, or a lower ability to 
supply assistance will be less successful in alliance formation. Further, states in less tense 
situations, with higher realignment alternatives will form less successful alliances. 
Alliances are further complicated as the purpose for the formation of the alliance is 
different among the different members (Sandler 1977). Some states may join because 
without the alliance their survival is at stake, while others do so as a matter of 
convenience.  
The setting of alliances affects the formation and aboration of alliances. In 
multipolar setting, states are more likely to abandon their alliances in favor of a different, 
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more beneficial arrangement (Leeds & Savun 2007). In a bipolar system, the two 
competing major powers are the two main suppliers of security, and thus there are two 
main sides that are competing against each other for the supply and demand of security. 
A unipolar system results in a greater demand than supply for security; therefore, minor 
powers must work harder to court the major power to gain any tangible benefit (Kim 
2016). This effect necessitates an understanding of the current international system. 
Brooks & Wohlforth (2016) argues that today’s world fails to fit in the nice conforms of 
Unipolarity or Bipolarity. Instead, America is classified as the lone superpower, China is 
a new, potentially rising superpower, and there is a combination of regional powers 
around the globe. This combines into a quasi-unipolarity in certain regions with qualities 
of bipolarity in others with Asia being classified as pseudo-bipolar.   
The classic point of view for alliances is that they are defensive coalitions that 
signal strength to deter potential enemies (Morrow 1993; Fuhrmann & Sechser 2014). 
There is a counter to this argument which shows that alliances can both defensive and 
offensive in nature - they can both “deter and assure” (Leeds 2003b). In other words, 
alliances that promise intervention in the case of defensive disputes reduces the 
probability that a military action will occur; however, those same alliances will also 
increase the likelihood of a military crisis if the alliance promises offensive support. 
These two types of alliances are not usually concurrent which implies that each 
individual alliance needs to be analyzed on the reasons for its formation. For both cases 
being researched in this study, the alliances were formed for defensive purposes and thus 
should follow the classic assumption of alliances through the literature.   
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States must work through the medium of the international arena, and their 
bureaucracy, to transfer the message of alliances. Fearon (1997) creates the idea of states 
signaling commitments to force themselves to act in the manner that the signals call for. 
A state does so to make its threats credible. There is a subtext in this argument that shows 
a level of uncertainty in a state’s action. That signaling requires a level of sunk cost 
commitment to be deemed as credible. This has a problem of producing a “security 
spiral” where normally non-aggressive neighbors, through their signaling, overestimate 
the security threat of the opposing state (Snyder 1984). Morrow (2016) finds evidence 
that defensive alliance signaling deters conflict if there is a recent history of conflict, but 
incites conflict if there is not a recent history. These results give an insight onto China’s 
view of its regional sphere. Viewing these alliances allied with America provokes fear 
and potentially incites greater levels of conflict due to the threat of being surrounded.  
Certain conditions predicted the success and length of an alliance. Alliances that 
are highly institutionalized with explicit norms regulating the decision making are those 
alliances that last the longest. Additionally, alliances are more likely to last longer if the 
alliance member states are predominantly liberal regimes (Bennett 1997; Reed 1997). 
This result comes from the different goals that states pursue when forming an alliance. 
Liberal regimes have adopted international norms and values that are consistent with 
other liberal regimes. These norms predicate cooperation as alliances are formed for more 
than just mutual defense, but to reduce transaction costs and increase cooperation 
between regimes (Conybeare & Kim 2010). These past three points highlight the 
weakness of these predictive variables. When applied to the two cases, both the 
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Philippines and Japan should maintain their alliance with the United States, but they do 
not, and thus more research is needed.  
Alliances can also be affected by the signaling of domestic politics to the state’s 
leader. Domestic opposition can increase the state’s bargaining power in the alliance, but 
it also puts pressure on the leader to alter the state’s relationship towards the alliance 
(Kim 2014a). The level of the effect depends on the amount of unhappiness towards the 
alliance and the level of exposure that the leader can be affected by the domestic will of 
the populace. Thus, the domestic attitudes of a democracy can potentially affect the 
alliance patterns of that state. As both of the cases are democracies, domestic attitudes 
and feelings are important points of information for determining alliance maintenance.  
The original literature assumes that alliances are formed among relatively equal 
power states. Morrow (1991) identifies two types of alliances: symmetric and 
asymmetric, and how these power relationships alter the assumptions of alliances. 
Symmetric alliances occur when two states join in a mutual alliance to protect each 
other’s security. Asymmetric alliances grant different benefits to different partners. The 
dominant partner gains “autonomy benefits.” These benefits are described as the ability 
to alter the status quo - an alternative definition of power. The minor states give up a 
portion of their autonomy in exchange for greater levels of security. This autonomy can 
be conceptualized as the ability for a state to decide its own actions. This might show in a 
minor power being compelled to form or decide a treaty in the interest of its security 
partner instead of in the interest of itself, or by providing geo-strategic support to the 
stronger ally. Oppositely, this bargain increases the level of autonomy for the dominant 
state to garner more security. This conclusion is supported by the model analysis of 
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Bennet (1997). This is the first ground mark study that highlights how relative 
capabilities changes the costs of alliance formation. Weaker states must pay using 
different value, leading to their cost benefit analysis being different from states more 
equal in capability.  
The benefits of military alliances are variable as well. Alliances allow for states to 
piggyback off the security produced by other states (Olson & Zeckhauser 1966). To a 
point, security is not an excludable benefit, and security benefits provided to one state for 
an alliance can also be applied to another state in lesser quantities. The level of general 
protection is increased by America’s maritime force projection, as the navy protection of 
waterways is transferred to all states that use those waterways. This further complicates a 
smaller powers cost benefit analysis. There is a level of free security for minimum cost 
provided by an alliance, but the further security comes at an increased cost of economics 
or autonomy. 
Entrapment is one of the greatest fears produced from an alliance. If a war occurs 
within an alliance it will drag the rest of the members into the conflict. Entrapment is 
more likely to occur in a bipolar system as opposed to a multipolar system. In a bipolar 
system, the minor power states are split among the two great powers, and those great 
powers fear their entrapment against the other through a proxy conflict (Snyder 1984). 
Kim (2011) shows that member states are constantly worried about being entrapped. 
When a state suspects that it is going to be pulled into a conflict, it will try to alter its 
relationship to avoid that responsibility. Further, stronger states can alter or change 
potentially entrapping situations. America has the greatest capacity to alter alliance 
conditions, and this ability is altered depending on the alliance dyad. It will actively work 
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to change a situation to escape the possibility of entrapment. A possible fear is being 
pulled into a hot conflict with China by one of its allies in the region, and thus why it 
works so hard to defuse conflict prone situations.  
Entrapment is dovetailed with the opposing problem of abandonment. Leeds et al. 
(2000) finds that a significant portion of alliances abandon their partners when the call for 
aid is sounded. In his analyses, 24.5% of alliances do not fulfill their commitments. Of all 
the relationships tested, major powers and non-democratic states most consistently 
abrogate their alliances due to the low cost for these states to do so (Leeds 2003a). A 
defensive alliance may not be formed with a true guarantee of military commitment. 
Instead they exist to deter potential military engagements with the hope of never getting 
involved. Instead, they work to actively signal intention to the alliance’s enemies 
(Morrow 2000; Fearon 1997). The best utility an alliance provides to its members is 
deterring potential action rather than providing true military assistance in an act of 
defense. These situations can lead to fear of abandonment by the smaller powers in the 
alliance. This fear can either lead to the state reinforcing its relationship with the more 
powerful partner, or taking less risks when the perceived fear of abandonment is high 
(Cha 2000).   
World Security threats have become more frequent from internal sources. After 
World War II, the instances of intrastate war have surpassed instances of interstate war. 
Alliances can serve a similar purpose to disperse an internal threat. However, the 
likelihood of this happening is lessened by the fact that the most established military 
alliances also coincide with the most internally stable states. It is possible for alliances to 
provide some form of military support to help a state combat some forms of insurgency 
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(Stepan 1973). The United States has provided arms to a plethora of alliance partners for 
the expressed purpose of fighting internal insurgencies. The Philippines throughout its 
history used its military alliance with the United States to help it fight its insurgency 
(Brands 1992).  
It is also important to briefly highlight the link between economy and security. 
Very broadly speaking, a state that performs better economically can defend itself against 
perceived threats from other states; however, security is a broad term with multiple 
definitions spanning the literature, and consistency is needed when referencing the term. 
Baldwin (2001) highlights the evolution of the concept of Security. At first it started as 
the perceived wellbeing of a state, but it has since evolved into “low politics” that 
includes concepts such as human security, economic security, environmental security, 
and a host of others. When looking at the mix between economy and security, it can be 
shown that having more economic output leads to problems in “low politics” security 
such as increased levels of terrorism and environmental degradation (Hameiri & Jones 
2015); however, for the purposes of simplicity in regards to the research question, when 
this paper uses the term “security” it is in relation to a state’s perceived capability to 
defend itself against the power from another state. Thus, through that distinction, having 
a better economy is correlated with greater level of security from state entities. For the 
most part, the alliance literature remains silent on whether the internal domestic 
economic condition of a state influences their alliance formation and maintenance – 
especially in regards to an oppositional power providing economic benefits. Thus, the 
research will see how economic conditions, combined with the other causal variables, 




Super Powers, Major Powers, Middle Powers, and Minor Powers. 
There is an unequal distribution of power between the states in the international 
system. In the foundational international relations literature, Waltz details how these 
superpowers run the global system. Per Waltz’ neorealism, great powers are the only 
states that truly matter. Non-great powers may be part of coalitions to balance against 
upcoming great powers, but they are merely reactive in nature. New literature presents a 
different picture. Non-great powers are not small pawns that purely react to transitions of 
power, but present more complicated behavior with their own rules and assumptions 
(Rothstein 1968; Gilley & O’Neil 2014). 
 The first change is the sprouting concept of “middle powers” in the literature, and 
how they can affect the global system. Middle powers are defined by Gilley & O’Neil 
(2014) by the power they have in relation to other states. They are defined as states that 
do not qualify as major powers, but who still have significant power or capabilities to 
alter the system in a meaningful way (Gilley & O’Neil 2014 P. 4). Seeing as the 
difference of capability is the main variable distinguishing between minor, middle, 
regional, and super powers, its definition should be clear. However, the definition is 
problematic because of the subjective interpretation required to put states into their 
classification. Super powers are characterized as the states with the greatest concentration 
of power. They have the greatest ability to exert their influence over other states within 
the system. Middle powers can best be described as those states with enough power to be 
able to successfully resist the influence of the super powers. This definition by itself 
leaves the concept wanting as the edges of the “middle power” circle is blurry enough to 
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leave some ambiguity. South Korea is a solid middle power with enough capability to 
have a meaningful influence on the international arena while also lacking the required 
power to make significant or lasting changes that would dictate the global order as a 
major power would be able to. 
The inherent ambiguity to the definition muddies the water for reliable 
interpretation for those states that straddle this line of power. India is bordering on the 
upper line of regional power status. For another example, Japan reached the requirements 
to be known as a regional great power, but chose in its national narrative to reduce its 
power capabilities to upkeep its image as non-threatening (Berger 2004), and thus its 
status is altered. On the other side of the spectrum is Thailand, which is not dominant in 
the global international system but has an extended influence in Southeast Asia as well as 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Thailand could both be considered 
a middle power or a minor power due to its relatively sizable, but comprehensively small, 
levels of capability. To a certain extent, classifying middle powers is subjective; 
however, there is a consensus within the literature on which states are clear middle 
powers.  
Middle powers have played an increasingly active role in the formation and 
passage of international institutions and international peacekeeping treaties such as the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P), the Ottowa Land Mine ban, and the Proliferated Security 
Initiative (Cooper 2011). By spearheading these actions, middle powers have a growing 
influence on the formation and evolution of the norms in the international system 
(Behringer 2012). There is a further argument that middle powers have greater power 
than minor powers but lack the ambitions of the major powers, which leads them to be 
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uniquely suited for peacekeeping initiatives. Behringer further extrapolates that the 
ambitiousness of middle powers is the drive for the evolution of human security. This, 
however, is countered by (Gilley & O’Neil 2014 P.36) to show that this idealized image 
of middle powers being benign in nature is unproven. There is no convincing evidence 
that middle powers are less threatening or have less threatening ambitions than their great 
power cousins. Further, the argument that middle powers prefer to act multilaterally due 
to their ideology also falls flat, as they usually have no other option (Keohane 1969). 
 Most important, middle powers are pro-multipolarity or counter hegemonic 
(Gilley & O’Neil 2014 P. 31). They can side with great powers among certain issues, but 
they are not cemented with the current great power partner. This is contrasted with those 
minor powers that pick sides, and are all but forced to maintain their relationships due to 
their deep level of dependence. For example, South Korea is currently aligned and allied 
with the United States, and this alliance is a deeply ingrained pact that can be traced back 
to the end of World War II; however, if South Korea wanted to alter or break off its 
relationship with the United States, it will suffer greatly, but it has the capability to do so 
if it wished.  
The most important take away of major powers is that they have agency. They 
may not be able to dictate the rules of the entire system, but they do have a sizable ability 
to decide their own decisions and bear the consequences, which in turn gives them a 
freedom to tread their own path in the international system, as well as working with other 
middle powers to check the major powers that exist. Using this concept of the middle 
power in the analysis of the research question then leads to an interesting avenue for 
analysis. It allows for a more nuanced understanding of these East Asian states and how 
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they handle this courting of great powers. They are not stuck making the decision 
between two great powers, as balance of power theory suggests, and instead can choose 
to alter their actions to dictate how great powers act towards them – at least for the 
stronger middle powers.  
Minor powers fall at the bottom of the hierarchy of the international arena. These 
are the states that are the fall below any other state in relative power capacity. They have 
fielded their own study as they work with assumptions different from the other two 
categories. Minor powers do not have the agency to directly alter events to those more 
powerful than them; they do not have the power to achieve the goals they are trying to 
achieve. They are drifters reacting to the flow of the greater powers. When forming 
alliances, minor powers must compromise or bandwagon, and as often as naught they are 
unsatisfied with the terms of their military alliance (Rothstein 1968). However, minor 
powers are not helpless. In the same way that middle powers can exert influence over the 
system in non-traditional ways, so too can these minor powers. They can provide 
narratives, influence norms, and take advantage of the international legal system to their 
benefit. Further, when they combine, they can amplify their influence. The G77 exists 
because it is more efficient than in the absence of cooperation. Understanding the 
differences in alliance relationships between super powers, middle powers, great powers, 
and minor powers is crucial to the study of Japan, the Philippines and the United States. 
Japan is a regional, major power, and thus has moderately more capability to determine 
its own decisions. The Philippines is a minor power, and therefor is stuck with the least 
agency in carving its own path, and must choose in the relationship between the two 





 Classical international relations theory has been based off the European 
experience. East Asia has been routinely downplayed in the inclusion of IR theory 
formation and application post World War II (Hundley et al 2015; Johnston 2012). Now, 
as the states in East Asia join the ranks of the great and regional powers, more attention is 
being paid towards the region. This shift can be characterized most famously when 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton signaled the “pivot to Asia” through the Obama 
administration. As Japan, and then China, became the third and second biggest 
economies respectively, and also considering the potential growth of other powers in the 
region -- specifically India -- there is an understanding that Asia will have the greatest 
share of importance in the future of international relations.  
 Starting with a narrative, the cold war ended, and Pax Americana began. These 
foundations were laid at the end of World War II. The war concluded, and two global 
superpowers rose from the ashes. Of the two, America came out unscarred, willing to 
lead the new, liberal, global order. It established the global foundations for this new 
system, and entrenched itself as the head of the international economic system. As the 
cold war played out, America and the Soviet Union both established extensive alliance 
networks to improve their respective status and to project their power around the globe. 
When the Cold war ended and the Soviet Union fell, Russia was unable to maintain most 
of its global allies, but America still had its network intact. Post 1991, for a brief glimpse, 
the United States was the unchallenged, unchecked global superpower. With its power, it 
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established a pseudo-hierarchical structure out of the traditional international anarchy 
(Goh 2008; Walt 2009).  
 Asia’s future is centered on the actions of China because it is the growing 
potential superpower. Superpowers, and to some extent regional powers, have a great 
influence on proximal states, and although minor and middle powers can affect the 
workings of superpowers, these superpowers are the leaders of the international parade. 
Realism paints a grim future for the region. Going back to Organski (1958), when states 
accumulate enough power to become major players in the system, conflict is inevitable. 
Rising great powers will challenge the current unipole. The dominant great power will do 
everything in its power to actively oppose this new challenger. Conflict of some form is 
inevitable, and either the new power will win and establish a new global order, or the 
established power will win and the same order will stay in place.  
This paradigm still has some utility, but it has become outdated in the modern 
world. For those interested in a catchy narrative, the rise of China will eventually result in 
conflict with the United States, but China’s potential rise is more nuanced and requires a 
greater level of academic rigor. The polarity of the system creates the setting for analysis 
of international relations, and thus determining the conditions of the setting is paramount; 
however, the literature on China’s rise emphasizes how scholars become stuck in a 
dichotomy of “unipolar,” “multipolar,” and “bipolar” which then narrows their analytical 
capacity (Brooks & Wohlforth 2016). China is a potentially rising superpower, and is 
beginning to challenge the unipolarity of the system, but it still has considerable 
challenges before it reaches superpower status, and analyzing those challenges is more 
useful than arbitrarily deciding if the system is unipolar or bipolar. 
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Will Asia’s future follow Europe’s past? There are worrying signs as China has 
been accelerating its defensive spending at an exponential rate (SIPRI). The fear is the 
promotion of a classic security dilemma; as China increases its defense spending, other 
states in the region will feel less secure and subsequently increase their defensive 
spending, which the leads into a feedback loop. The literature, for the most part, assumes 
that events will not play out exactly to this point due to various ameliorating institutions, 
but the potential for a frictious relationship in the region is still high (Liff & Ikenberry 
2014). Paying homage to the fact that security is not what happens but what is perceived 
to happen, there is a fear that China and the United States have been, and will be, 
contentious with each other solely for the fact that there is a narrative that they will be in 
contention with each other (Pan 2014). This is not to say that a fear of China from its 
Asian neighbors is unfounded. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has not been the 
only military spending that has been increasing exponentially. The PLA navy, although 
still in its infancy, has been growing with China trying to deploy two aircraft carriers into 
their regional waters. The PLA has also deployed a series of conventional strategic 
ballistic missiles along its coast. These missiles are colloquially called “carrier killers” 
among the forces manning them and they serve a dual purpose of hitting enemy 
command structures and providing a credible threat to American carrier groups in the 
region (National institute for defense studies 2016). Among the other Asian powers, these 
actions look threatening; however, turning the table, it is entirely reasonable China has 
been pursuing this defense spending growth due to its own insecurity. Since the Obama 
administration pledged a “pivot to Asia” the US navy has pledged to convert sixty 
percent of its operating procedure into the pacific (De Castro 2016).  
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 Except for a few holdouts, most recent scholars hold different, more optimistic 
predictions about the future of Asia. The argument is not just the pure peaceful 
relationship between the two, but that there will not be a titanic struggle to reaffirm the 
new world hierarchy. China, at the outset of its rise, has supported status-quo measures 
instead of projecting great power challenges (Johnston 2003; Beeson 2009; Schweller & 
Pu 2011). The United States has established itself as the premier power in East Asia 
through a combination of security relations and international institutions developed after 
World War II. This might be an argument that requires more time, but for China to rise to 
regional hegemonic status in the region, it should challenge the United States both 
economically and militarily. However, China has displayed a supporting – or at least 
shirking – role to the US led international order (Lee 2015). China is still gaining extreme 
levels of benefit from the current international order, and it would be counterproductive 
for it to challenge a system that has benefited it so much. Simultaneously even if China 
wanted to challenge the current US led system, it is still too weak to do so. The nature of 
great power conflict has also changed within the system. The likelihood of a direct 
conventional military challenge in the future is miniscule due to the self-destructive 
nature of nuclear warfare as well as the norms promoted by the international institutions 
post-World War II (Finnemore 1993). 
 Since the end of the cold war and the economic rise of China, there has been a 
trending concept among the literature about the idea of a “Two Asias.” Traditionally, 
security and economic prosperity are two parallel concepts in a state’s measure of 
success, but this Two Asias idea has thrown that on its head. Instead, as Feigenbaum and 
Manning (2012) eloquently writes, “In today’s Asia, economics and security … are 
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almost completely in collision.”  Traditionally, economic benefit translates into greater 
power both through economic means as well as the ability to acquire martial power (Nye 
1990). There is some debate about whether power increases security with context 
depending on the state’s situation, but the assumption will be made in a vacuum of total 
consensus that an increase of economic power leads to an increase in security through the 
greater ability for higher levels of defense spending. However, the Two Asia’s argument 
asserts that in Asia, these two forces are separated, and gaining greater economic benefit 
through China will ultimately reduce the state's security due to the distance acquired from 
the United States.  
John Ikenberry is the principle scholar arguing this point of view. In Ikenberry 
(2016) he asserts the occurrence of a dual hierarchy of security and economy, and how 
America and China are going to be competing at greater levels to sway the middle and 
minor powers of the region to their respective side. Further, he argues that these middle 
powers want this dual hierarchy to continue as it increases the value and resources that 
they can get from the competing superpowers. He further merges this argument with the 
influential ability of the “middle powers,” and how they combined are the third balancer 
to maintain the status-quo in the region. This argument of action among the middle 
powers needs to be expanded. Not all the powers will react in the same way. Borrowing 
on psychological literature, individuals become more risk averse the wealthier they 
become. A poorer individual will partake in more risk seeking behavior to increase his or 
her wealth (Kihlstrom et al 1981). Extrapolating from this assumption from humans to 
states, economically strong powers will act differently from the powers that are 
economically weak. If there is a contention between economics and security in the 
21 
 
region, poor states may be more risk averse to gain some form of economic benefit in 
exchange for less security.  
There has been a long running and contentious history between the states in this 
region. This historical memory causes a tremendous quantity of tension between these 
Asian states. The historical memory, in some circumstances, is so vivid that it affects the 
state’s security perception (Gustafsson 2014). Japan is the most iconic example of this 
historical memory. Before and during World War II, its imperial ambitions led it to 
colonize the Korean peninsula, colonize both Southeast Asia and Indochina, and 
humiliate China by stripping it of its rights and territory. Then during World War II, it 
warred with China, and instigated some of the worst human right atrocities during the 
war. Each of these states affected by Japan have a strong memory about these events. For 
example, Shin (2010) notes how South Korean students were equally as fearful of 
Japanese ambitions as they were of China’s ambitions against Korea. This attitude has 
required Japan to present itself as a pacifist state with no imperial ambitions. However, 
this narrative has been contrasted by the state’s unwillingness to acknowledge the 
atrocities that it committed during World War II. This historical memory plays into the 
perceived threat of Japan by China, and the reactionary perception of threat from Japan 
thereafter.  
China has existed in a US dominated Asia. After World War II, the United States 
made the crucial decision to play an active role in the rebuilding of Japan, and the 
formation of an alliance network to counter both the Soviet threat, and then the 
Communist Chinese threat later. The United States formally created a web of allies 
within Asia, which will be known hereafter as the US block. This block included: Japan, 
22 
 
South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, Australia, New Zealand and the Philippines. For the rest 
of the 20th century, America provided both security goods and economic goods to these 
countries; it was the sole hierarchy in the region (Ikenberry 2016). 
 Since Deng Xiaoping became the de facto ruler of mainland China, China’s GDP 
has had a steady double digit growth up until the late 2010s (World Bank). Starting in 
1978, and going to 2016, China has had consistent, double-digit GDP economic growth 
every year. In the span of thirty years, hundreds of millions of people have been lifted out 
of poverty, and the state is undergoing the fastest industrialization seen in history. Its 
growth was the single greatest contribution to global growth in world GDP, and it is the 
biggest exporter in the world. This growth in GDP and exportation has natural spillover 
effects to all the other states in the region who have piggybacked on that growth (Wong 
2013). In pure economics, America has been the principal trading partner with almost 
every state in the region. Now, China has been supplanting America as the dominant 
trading partner for these states. Further, China has been willing to share some of its 
newfound wealth by giving “no strings attached” loans to these countries to promote 
economic growth as a part of its soft power Charm Offensive (Kurlantzick 2006).  
One of the newest shifts in China’s action towards the international system is the 
creation of the Asian Infrastructure investment bank (AIIB). This bank was created to 
provide low cost loans toward developing states to close the infrastructure gap in the 
region while simultaneously improving the connectivity in the region through this 
transportation infrastructure. The bank would give precedence towards ASEAN states, 
but any state willing to pay the fee towards it would be allowed to join. The bank was 
lauded by foreign policy experts as one of the first major challenges to the Bretton 
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Woods financial systems. China was placing its cards on the table as an economic world 
leader, and the United States saw the establishment as a direct affront to its own financial 
institutions (Mishra 2016). At this point, these states now have an alternative supply of 
economic goods to promote their national growth policies. The investing power of the 
AIIB does not seriously contend with the World Bank, but it signaled a break on the 
traditional monopoly.  
 The current argument now, is that Chinese economic growth is significant enough 
to not necessarily outweigh the benefits provided by the United States, but for it to be a 
viable contender in providing benefit to these countries. The problem comes from both 
the anticipated threat that these countries fear from China, and the threatening actions that 
China has already performed. Many of these US allies suffer from a historical memory 
with China, and it is now increasing its military capability at an accelerated rate. These 
countries are presented with the greater potential economic benefit by working with 
China, but suffer from a potential security loss from the United States if they do so. China 
has been actively trying to suppress this threatening image that the world is trying to 
paint over it. Dispelling this image was the principal motivation for their Charm 
Offensive. However, the success of this Charm Offensive has been variable with non-
Asian states being the most convinced (Glosny 2017).  
 There is an opposition argument that economic integration in the region will cause 
a decrease in the region’s insecurity (Sridharan 2014). The mechanisms for this argument 
follow the pathway that greater integration will cause an inter reliance of the relationships 
between these states that would make it too costly for conflict to occur. Second, closer 
economic integration will increase interactions between these powers and simplistically 
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allow for better relationships through repeated and systematized interactions. This 
argument holds support when analyzing Europe as the continent is relatively conflict free, 
which can partially be ascribed to the extreme level of economic integration present; 
however, there are some major differences between Europe and Asia that could be the 
deciding variable in different outcomes for the region. Europe benefits from a whole host 
of international institutions that increase communication between the member states 
which allows stable avenues of conflict resolution. Asia, for the most part, is lacking in 
these strong institutions that are present in Europe, and if conflict were to break out, the 
powers in the region have less institutional support to peacefully resolve the conflict 
(Moon & O’callaghan 2005). Furthermore, Europe is experiencing a relative stability in 
power relationships. There is no country that is growing in power relative to the other 
states in the region that would cause any potential conflict. In Asia, in the span of three 
decades, two of the three most powerful economies in the world sprang up with an 
external balancer in the mix, and the tension level between these powers is much higher 
than anything in Europe. Higher economic integration is part of the pathway to ensure 
greater peace, but it is not a guarantee for the absence of conflict.   
 Testing the alliance structure of Asia by doing a case comparison has been done 
in the field before. Park (2011) performed a case comparison of South Korea and the 
Philippines and found that each country’s security needs determined who they 
strengthened their alliance with. De Castro (2001) in his Ph.D. dissertation performed a 
case comparison of Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, and found that alliance 
management combined with external threat explained the long-lasting nature of the 
alliances in the region. Of all the comparisons done find that external threat is a problem 
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that determines alliance relationship, but no one focuses on whether economics has a 
noticeable effect on whether these states strengthen or alter their relationship with the 
United States.  This is the gap within the literature.  
Economic Theory of Alliances 
Olson & Zeckhauser (1966) started the literature of applying economic theory to 
the creation and maintenance of alliances. This theory works with the assumptions that 
alliance assurance and security are public goods with non-excludable benefits. The 
original theory, known as the exploitation hypothesis, provided a formal model that 
showed the relationship of spending between two partners in an alliance, and how there 
was an imbalance between how much the most powerful partner paid towards the 
alliances in relations to the less powerful partner. Smaller states piggybacked off the 
spending of the more powerful states. The evidence for this conclusion is drawn from 
NATO spending, and how the United States paid the overwhelming majority for defense 
benefits in that security regime (Ringsmose 2009). The most important assumption of 
Olson and Zeckhauser is that security is a non-rivalrous good that states want and pay for. 
By conceptualizing security as an abstract good economic laws and theories can be 
applied to the analysis and applications of these goods.  
 The model presented in the economic theory of alliances was further expanded 
upon by multiple scholars (Sandler 1977; Mcguire 1990). For example, In Sandler 
(1999), the model is expanded to factor in the net benefit of alliance formation and 
expansion in regards to the geography of the states. The model created shows how the 
closer geography of a threat causes the alliance member to contribute more defense 
towards the whole alliance. Overall, Sandler & Hartley (2001) performs a good summary 
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of the evolution of these models, and where they can still evolve. His two biggest 
critiques involve factoring in arms races of opposing alliances and applying time series 
analyses to capture the fluctuating demand for defense among certain states. A debate 
within the literature is the level at which these defensive goods are shared among the 
member states in the regime. They argue that the ability to share depends on the good. 
Certain goods only provide benefit to the producing state while others provide benefit to 
the entire alliance. The new model provided altered the traditional economic model by 
representing the utility spending of a country on the alliance as a cooperative relationship, 
based on each state’s comparative advantage. 
 Hitch & McKean (1960) shows that states have different comparative advantages 
in regards to their defense industry. This comparative advantage then affects the nature of 
security derived from the defense relationship because certain goods provide general 
benefits to the alliance whereas others are more specific. Hartley (2006) shows the nature 
of the defense goods depends on the trade policy between the states in the alliance. The 
trade policy has a tremendous effect on the goods developed and ultimately the nature of 
the entire relationship. Using NATO as an example, a relationship begins to show that the 
free trade policy between the European members increased the specialization of 
production and allows for a more efficient production of defense within the regime.  
Kim (2016) contends with the assumptions of these models. He argues three 
points. First, security is rivalrous and excludable. In other words, security should be 
treated as a private good instead of a public good. Second, it is assumed that alliance 
goods are also rivalrous. By becoming a member of one alliance, the state is losing out on 
the opportunity to form an alliance with another state. Last, the supply of security is not 
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infinite, and in fact comes with its own rules. Great powers in security relationships are 
only willing to supply security if it is in their interest to do so. The less valuable it is to 
supply security, the more it cost for the minor powers to buy into the relationship. Kim 
argues that this supply is affected by the polarity of the international system. Two major 
powers who are contending against each other are more willing to supply security to 
minor powers; whereas, a lone major power has no oppositional force, and will charge 
more for their security benefits.  
  This applies to the modern historical system in three separate phases. The first 
was during the Cold War where the United States actively provided a supply of security 
to counter the Soviet Union. The second phase occurred when the Soviet Union fell, and 
America was the lone superpower in the world. At this point, the supply for security fell 
as America no longer had any enemy to work against. The last phase is now involving the 
perceived rise of China. With another superpower potentially on the rise, the supply of 
security coming from America is costing less as the United States is actively trying to 
keep its allies in preparation from a potential new superpower.  
Kim’s theory further contributed to the literature by involving the idea that there 
are nonmilitary goods that affect the relationships between these countries. These non-
military goods can be used as part of the bargaining process for security goods in a 
security relationship. Lastly, the value of these goods is determined by the law of supply 
and demand. The marginal utility of both security and non-security goods is determined 
by how much a state already holds. Each state has a marginal utility in wanting security 
which is determine by the current amount of security that the state already holds. The 
prices for each good is set by these forces. 
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The economic theory of alliances will be used to analyze the research question. 
Part of this analysis will involve using an internal utility exchange model. Sandler & 
Hartly (2001) provide a basic internal exchange utility model:  
𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(𝑦𝑖, 𝑞𝑖 + 𝑄−𝑖, 𝑇) 
Which highlights the maximum utility that a powerful or weak state can get from sharing 
the burden of defense. “y” represents a public good of defense; “q” represents the state’s 
spending on defense; Q represents the other members spending on defense; and T 
represents the threat. They then take this indifference curve and apply it to an alliance 
dyad to show the equilibrium of spending for both partners. This model shows the 
possibilities of modeling the utility value of security goods. The model used in this 
analysis looks different and ascertains its values in different ways, but this study shows 
the validity of applying an internal utility exchange model to the research question to 
highlight the relationship of security versus economy, while ascertaining generalizable 
assumptions afterwards. 
Kim’s theory is also going to be an important tool to analyze the research 
question. The alliances between the states in Asia and the United States will be treated 
using this economic theory of alliance interpretation. Security can be classified as a 
rivalrous good that these states want, and they trade some form of economic benefit in 
exchange for these security goods. The American alliance provides security that each one 
of these states receives in return for goods that they provide the United States. This 
security comes at a cost for the American allies both in the value that they give in 
exchange for the security as well as other benefits that they would not otherwise receive 
because they are paying for the security. Oppositely, strengthening relationships with 
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China will lead to greater economic goods, but also cost security in lower relationships 
with the United States. These assumptions will be combined with an original model of 
internal exchange to highlight the marginal utility value of security versus economy for 
the economically strong Japan and the economically weak Philippines.  
There are two additions that are conjoined in character that this research paper 
will ultimately add. The temporal security conditions of the states within the alliance as 
well as the economic conditions of the state. The models provided in the economic 
alliance literature never explicitly write about changing security relationships. They all 
assume that states are in alliances, and that their contributions are only predicated on their 
capacity to give towards the alliance. The argument provided is that states that feel less 
secure are more willing to either donate a greater level of their own recourses into the 
alliance’s security, or to provide a greater exchange of resources to the alliance to garner 
more security from their great power allies. States that experience greater levels of threat 
spend more on their defense (Gadea et al 2004; Nordhaus et al 2012). The second 
addition also considers the specific “Two Asia’s” argument that security and economic 
structures are different in Asia, and that economic conditions affect how states play off 
these two different hierarchies in conjunction with the wealth of those states.  
 
Analysis and Model Application. 
 Part of the analysis focuses on determining the level of effect that a state’s 
economic condition plays in that state’s decision between the two powers. To highlight 
the theoretical relationship between economic conditions and how those conditions 
contend with threat to alter state behavior, a formal internal utility exchange model will 
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be constructed. This formal model will allow for a deductive insight into the research 
question by presenting a simplified picture of the real world (Lave & March 1975).  
An internal exchange utility model is predicated by the conditions and context by 
which each resource is considered valuable. An entity's utility is based on the conditions 
that determine the resources it has and more importantly the resources it does not have. 
There are two component parts that create a model of internal exchange. The first part is 
the budget constraint equation. This equation shows the marginal utility value of the two 
contrasting goods to the entity in question, while also showing the maximum amount of 
currency that the entity can spend on buying both. Simplistically, the entity values two 
goods differently, and it has a finite amount of currency to spend on a combination of 
those two goods.  
The second component part of the model is the indifference model equation. This 
equation shows a specific utility, and all the possible combinations between the two items 
that equal the specific utility. The entity is indifferent to all combinations on the curve 
because it gains the same utility from any combination of the goods. When putting these 
two equations together, the budget constraint shows the possible combinations that the 
entity could buy with the currency it has, while the indifference curve, when it is 
tangential to the budget constraint line, shows the best possible combination with the 
currency available. For this analysis, the most important result is the steepness of the 
indifference curve. The shallower the curve for the good’s respective axis, the more 
valuable that good is in relation to the other good.  
 The Two Asia’s argument relies on the assumption that there is a difference 
between security and economy; that states must choose between one against the other on 
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a sliding scale between their great power relationships. There are different times for both 
Japan and the Philippines that shows their different level of security perception based on 
the actions of China. This threat perception changes the value of the security and 
economic goods that changes the indifference curve to highlight the marginal utility value 
of these goods. The indifference curve shows the point at which the entity received equal 
value based off the diminishing marginal returns for both goods. The steeper the curve 
for one of the utilities means the less valuable that resource is in relation to the resources 
already acquired. 
The slope of this curve changes in relation to external circumstances, and the 
value of these circumstances needs to be determined in a reliable way. To keep the 
reliability of the original exchange model consistent, another model was developed to 
highlight the level of security that a state holds. The value for this equation will detail the 
level of perceived security that a state has, which will then be used to find the insecurity 
to prescribe value to additional good increases. This model will be applied to the budget 
restraint equation to determine the maximum utility that a state derives from security 
goods. The model involves the analysis of the ratio of force projection capabilities that 
both it and the oppositional state has. Then this value will be subsequently multiplied by 
the perceived intent of the original country. It is important to note that this equation 
represents the perceived level of security, not the actual level of security.  The model 
presents itself as:  
(1).  𝑆𝑖 = (
𝐹𝑖 + 𝐹𝑢
𝐹𝑗 + 𝐹𝑧
) ∙  𝐼𝑗𝑖 , 0 > 𝐼𝑗𝑖 > 1 
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For this equation 𝑆𝑖 is representative of the perceived security of the state “i.” The F 
variable is a representation of military force projection capabilities of the state labeled in 
the subscript. The variables in the numerator within the parenthesis is a representation of 
the state being studied in addition to the combined force projection powers of that state’s 
alliance. The variables within the denominator represent the force projection capabilities 
of the threatening state and the composite force projection capabilities of other threats in 
the immediate region. Combined, the value derived within the parenthesis shows the ratio 
of force projection capabilities between the two states.  
The variable I in equation 1 represents the perceived intent of state “j” towards 
state “i”. This variable is counted on a range of 0 to 1 with 1 indicating an intent of total 
benevolence in regards to its force capability against country “i”, and 0 representing a 
total and immediate perceived intent to use force against country “i”. This value is 
included within the model to highlight how the perceived intent of a state to use its 
military alters the threat perception from that state. This variable is included on the basis 
that threat perceived from the amount of military power is interacted on the likelihood 
that a state is willing to use that power.  Weaker states that show a greater perceived 
willingness to use their power will cause more insecurity than states with greater levels of 
power coupled with benign intentions. Once the force projection ratio has been calculated 
and multiplied by the intent variable, a value between 0 and 1 will be acquired that 
represents the broad perceived security of the state. 0 represents total insecurity, while 1 
represents total security.  
The value of security goods is determined by the quantity of goods that a state 
holds contrasted with the demand of those goods. By working with the assumption that 
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all states want perfect security, the insecurity variable labeled IS, is attained by 
subtracting the value of security by 1.  
(2). 𝐼𝑆𝑖 = 1 − 𝑆𝑖 
Once the insecurity value is obtained, that will then be applied to the budget restraint 
model in equation 5. This lack of security is what predicates the value of a security 
variable as states want universal maximum security.  
 An internal exchange model with an indifference curve demands two goods that 
an actor must choose from, and the second one in this model is economic need. This 
variable will use the Human Development Index (HDI) which is an established model 
that rates a state’s life expectancy, education, and GDP per capita to create a scale 
between zero and one that rates the overall development of a state with a higher value 
equaling more development. In this model, 0 represents the total void of humanity, and 1 
represents a perfect Utopia. The HDI is the scale that both the UN and the IMF apply to 
analyze the development level of a state. To accurately quantify the need for greater 
levels of economy, the economic need equation will be represented as: 
(3). 𝐸𝑁𝑖 = 1 − 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖 
This equation will be used to denote the intensity of the economic need of a state. The 
higher the value of 𝐸𝑁𝑖 indicates the hypothetical level that a country can grow in 
development, as well as how valuable an additional unit increase of economic goods is.  
 Once these values are derived, they can be applied to the internal exchange 
model. Which consists of two parts: the budget constraint equation and the indifference 
curve equation.  These equations are represented respectively as 
(4). (𝐸𝑁𝑖)𝑥 +  (𝐼𝑆𝑖)𝑦 = 𝐵𝑅 
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(5). 𝑈𝑖 = 𝑈𝑖(𝐸𝑁𝑖 , 𝐼𝑆𝑖) 
The budget restraint model is represented by equation 4. This model takes the two values 
derived from equation 3 and 2, and attaches them to each variable. BR represents the 
amount of “spending points” that each country holds. Within the equation, each entity has 
a limited amount of currency for which they can spend for the two goods available. 
The actual amount of this spending points for this research is arbitrary for two 
reasons. First, the economic and security goods that this model portrays are too abstract 
to have any real meaning. Second, the amount of spending alters the optimal combination 
of goods, but it does not affect the curvature of the indifference curve, which is the focus 
of this model.  
Higher values for either EN or IS represents a greater need for economics or 
security, and thus dictate that the marginal utility for each of these curves. Within the 
graphical representation, the steepness of the curve indicates the value of one good to 
another. If the curve is shallow for the specific good’s axis, then that shows the higher 
value of the good. For example, if the curve is more shallow for security, it shows that the 
state is willing to trade more units of economic goods for just one unit of security goods. 
The steeper the curve for the specific good, the more valuable the opposing good is. 
Almost all the variables through the various models are relatively stable over a 
combination of years. The force projection capabilities and the economic conditions of a 
state can change, but that change is gradual, and it almost always happens over years or 
decades. Thus, the only variable that has the capacity to change at a moment’s notice is 
the intent variable in equation 1. The perception of intention can change within a day. For 
example, China has spent years promoting itself as having harmonious intent on a 
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peaceful rise, but this image can be challenged immediately when they use military force 
to bully a neighboring minor power. The intent represents this capacity for perceptions to 
change suddenly, and the tremendous effect that has on a state’s insecurity.  
On an aggregate, this model portrays the value of economic and security goods in 
relation to threat, economic need, and intention. When values are inserted into the model, 
the difference in value between poor states and rich states should be immediately shown, 
as poor states will value economic goods higher than rich states in the presence of equal 
threat. Once these initial relationships are established, the model will portray how this 
value is altered on the more volatile intent variable. The change in this variable will 
highlight the extremes for both poor and rich states. At the lowest values of intent, rich 
and poor states should value security goods over economic goods; however, at the highest 
values of intent, rich states will still value security goods over economic goods while 
poor states will value economic goods over security goods.  
Model Application Example 
Formal models are an exercise in theoretical deduction that highlight potential 
relationships based off the variables included in the model. The model constructed 
highlights a relationship for state’s demand for security goods based off its insecurity and 
the contrast in its economic need. A graphical representation will be shown to highlight 
how the interaction of these variables alters the preferences of the states. To provide an 
example of this model, values will be attributed to the two proposed cases which differ on 
their economic strength as well as their potential security threats. Applying this model 
should indicate how a state’s economic conditions affects its demand for security and 
economic goods.   
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The values for the two cases will be used as examples to provide a representation 
of how alterations to these variables changes utility value of the opposing goods to these 
states. To provide initial consistency for the values within the equation, the Correlates of 
War Composite National Capability Index will be used to input values for the force 
projection variable. The Composite Capability variable is an aggregate of each state’s 
military personnel data, expenditure, iron and steel production, energy consumption, and 
total population. It is developed to represent the total capacity for a state to make war. 
This does not necessarily capture the concept of force projection, but in the absence of a 
consistent measure of force projection, this value will suffice.  
For the application of this model, subscript “i” will represent both cases. The 
model will be applied to Japan and the Philippines over different episodes in their 
timeline. Subscript “j” will represent China. Subscript “u” will represent the United 
States and other security allies within Asia. Subscript “z” will represent any other 
composite threat that is presented to either of the cases in the region by other powers. 
Thus, the composite abilities of the United States, the US block, and the current case will 
be added together, and then divided by the capabilities of China and any other potentially 
threatening state in the region. This will represent the force projection capabilities of the 
US alliance, and the perceived oppositional military forces that China can present against 
it. Once this is calculated, the economic need of each case will be determined through the 
HDI of each country for their respective time periods. These values will be inserted into 
the budget restraint model, which will then highlight how the two cases value economic 
and security goods.   
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The last important value to consider is the intent variable. The intent variable can 
immediately change after the occurrence of a threatening event or action. The quick 
changing nature of this variable can alter the cases’ utility value for the two competing 
goods almost instantaneously. With the other two variables from the model only 
changing at a gradual pace, the intent variable will provide the greatest level of variance 
within the model, and the change in the intent will have different effects of the evaluation 
of one good over the other. More importantly, the change of the intent variable will 
highlight how poor and rich countries evaluate the value of economic and security goods 
differently under different conditions of threat.  
Running the values of the two cases through the equation presents a graph that 
shows insightful results which represents how these two differing countries value security 
and economy over time. Figure 1 is a representation of Japan in the year 2000. During 
this period, China’s military capabilities are still growing, but it has not turned any heads 
yet. Further, to use Deng Xiaoping’s phrase, the foreign policy of the country still 
followed the phrase of “biding one’s time.” The threat from North Korea was also 
slightly cooling down because of the efforts of South Korea in the Sunshine policy, and at 
this point it had not yet developed atomic weaponry or ICBM capabilities. Thus, the 
equivalent value of Japan’s security and economic goods are roughly equal with security 
goods being only slightly more valued. Figure 2 represents Japan in 2013. This Figure 
represents the change in value of the two goods when China has been exponentially 
expanded its military while also projecting a threatening posture towards Japan. China at 
this point has been actively confrontational towards Japan regarding the issue of the 
Senkaku Islands. North Korea has actively tested multiple atomic weapons, and is in the 
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process of developing ICBM technologies. In this stage, security is tremendously more 
valuable to Japan than economic gains. At this point in the graph, Japan is willing to trade 
a tremendous number of economic goods for a single unit increase in its security goods. 
This correlates with the real world as Japan has maintained the strength of its alliance 
with the United States since 2013. Figure 3 combines both graphs and shows the 
difference in the optimal combination while also highlighting the different indifferent 
curves per each situation. The change in force projection capabilities dovetailed with the 
more threatening intent resulted in the change of these two goods’ value. 
Figure 4 shows the Philippines in the year 2000. Again, at this point, China had 
not been actively projecting its military force within the region, and thus the Philippines 
held comparatively less security fears from it. This representative as the graph shows that 
economy is more valuable than security for the state. This value only slightly changes by 
2012. In Figure 5 the need for security has gone up only slightly, but the economic need 
of the Philippines has stayed relatively consistent. The curve changes in figure 6 right 
after the Scarborough Shoal incident. Security goods become more valuable than 
economic goods, but the ratio of value between the two goods is slight. It would only take 
a small difference in the combinations to produce an exorbitant ratio of goods in 
exchange for the other. Again, this correlates with the state at the time. It has security 
issues and it was willing to strengthen its relationship with the United states, but its 
relative poverty means that economic goods are still important. With a small change of 
intent, economic goods become more valuable, and therefore they are willing to go back 
and work with China. This is the opposite result for Japan. A positive change of the intent 
variable does little to change the utility that it gains from increasing economics.  
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Models are simplistic representations of the real world. They are constructed to 
simplify phenomena that occur within the world. This model ultimately represents a 
relationship between rich and poor states, and how they interact to greater levels of threat. 
Economic conditions matter when determining how non-great powers react towards two 
oppositional hierarchies. When states feel threatened, they strengthen their relationship 
with their Security ally, but when that threat partially subsides, the weaker economy of 
the Philippines values economic goods more highly, while Japan maintains the security 
over economic goods relationship. Through the examples provided by this model, the 
effects of economic conditions are highlighted in the in the relationship and decision that 
these powers have between the two contrasting forces. The next step is providing support 





How do middle and minor powers react towards the shift of great powers in East 
Asia? Does the economic strength of a country affect the decision that country makes 
between two oppositional great powers? Will the economic conditions of Japan and the 
Philippines affect how these two countries decide between strengthening their 
relationship with China or the United States? These are the research questions that this 
research project will try to answer.  
First, the question requires an initial population to be studied. The problem is 
there is a small initial population for this research question. On one aspect, in a more 
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abstract sense, the research question addresses the courting of non-major powers into 
alliance relationships with the current great powers. On another aspect, the question 
involves the decision of states to choose between their economic interests and their 
security interests. Both aspects combine to present the situation in Asia. This situation in 
Asia has provided one of the clearest cut examples of the economic and security benefits 
for a state being so perpendicular to each other. Therefore, studying these Asian-
American allies are the best modern examples to study how states react to opposing great 
powers and the utility that each one provides. Thus, to test the theory, I am going to 
perform qualitative analysis using a Mill’s Most Similar System’s Design with a critical 
paired comparison between Japan and the Philippines to provide support for the 
relationship shown in the formal model. The hypotheses are: 
 
H1: The economic conditions of a state affect the level of maintenance that the state 
invests in its alliance. 
H2: In the presence of threat, both a rich state and a poor state will strengthen its 
relationship with its military ally.  
H3: In the absence of threat, a rich state will maintain its relationship with its military 
ally. 
H3a: In the absence of threat, a poor state will strengthen its relationship with the 
economic power at the expense of its military ally. 
 
 With the number of observations possible, a large-N study using statistical 
hypothesis testing would be inappropriate. A small-N comparative case study will 
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provide an internally valid insight into identifying and understanding this process as well 
as the variables that drive it (George & Bennett 2005). Thus, for this research project, two 
cases will be chosen within the population in accordance to the variance of the 
independent variable. The two cases chosen are Japan and the Philippines.   
Small-N comparative case studies have the endemic problem of selection bias. It 
is the flaw that always works against the qualitative researcher. That the researcher “picks 
cases to prove a hypothesis rather than to test one.” The formal model does ameliorate 
this problem slightly. These two states were chosen to fit the relationship highlighted 
within the formal model. Poor states act differently from rich states, and Japan is rich 
while the Philippines is poor. By evaluating the actions of these states in relations to their 
alliance with the United States and their economic relationship with China, it can be 
discerned whether there is evidence for economic conditions affecting alliance 
maintenance. The hopeful conclusion of this research project is to show how economic 
status of a state affects the relationship of its allies especially when there is an opposing 
power providing some level of economic benefit.  
 Japan and the Philippines will be analyzed using process tracing measures which 
will look at specific points in the timeline of the two cases to capture the decision change 
the cases make in their relationship between the two hierarchies. The two cases will then 
be compared by the difference of their actions throughout their timelines. This qualitative 
critical case comparison will provide support for the relationship detailed in the model by 
providing insight into how these non-major powers react towards oppositional forces that 






 The selection process for the two cases involved multiple steps. The potential 
population for this research equation was initially restricted to states within the region of 
the Asia-Pacific excluding China. This decision was made to adequately capture the 
states fully exposed to the Two Asia’s dual hierarchy. The population was further 
restricted to those states that have an official military alliance with the United States. This 
was to ensure that the cases officially received their security benefits from the United 
States and not from some other source. Within this population, the cases would be chosen 
based of their variance on the main independent variable.  
Japan and the Philippines were chosen based off the variance in their economic 
conditions within the population of interest. Per the World Bank, Japan’s GDP per capita 
is $34,523 and the Philippine’s is $2,904. In the rankings, Japan is shown as 27th and the 
Philippines as 117th in relation to the rest of the world. These countries’ overall GDP are 
$16.7 trillion and $292 billion respectively. In terms of ranking of GDP Japan is 3rd, and 
the Philippines is the 38th. The discrepancy between these two is the difference between 
a developed and a developing economy, and this alteration in economic capability versus 
the relative stability in security presents an acceptable test to show how economics 
affects the decisions of non-great powers to choose their allies per the Two Asias Theory. 
 In addition, they both hold a host of similar variables constant, which allows for a 
greater ability to isolate the causal variables to identify this alliance maintenance process. 
Both the Philippines and Japan are in approximately the same region. Both are island 
states, with roughly the same population. The Philippines has a population of 100 million, 
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and Japan has a population of 120 million. There cultures are not shared, but they are 
more similar to each other than to western culture. They are both allies of the United 
States and have been so for more than 50 years. Japan is a fully established and mature 
democracy, and the Philippines officially became a democracy in 1992 with the election 
of President Ramos. Additionally, both states have had some form of anti-American 
domestic protest within their recent history.  
 Both states have, at one point in their history, been occupied by the United States. 
However, this occupation has presented itself in different forms. The Philippines was a 
colony of the United States from 1898 to 1946, but Japan was occupied by American 
military forces from 1945 to 1952 after a scorched earth military bombing campaign. 
Long term colonial occupations produce different moods and feelings within the 
population than heavily damaging military bombing campaigns; however, there is still a 
similarity that both states lost their sovereignty for a period of time to the United States.   
 In relation to the research question, each state has had a contentious altercation 
with China over disputed territory. The Philippines has had a continuous six-year fight 
for a host of island chains in the South China Sea including the landmass of the 
Scarborough Shoal. The Japanese had the contest of the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands. These 
disputes are not identical as Japan has the capacity to challenge China militarily, and the 
Philippines does not; however, in both cases, China has used military force to try and 
assert its authority on the subject. Furthermore, both territorial disputes have not been 
resolved. The Senkaku/Diaoyu island debate has cooled off, but both states have not 
made any indication that they relinquish their control over the islands. For the 
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Scarborough Shoal, there has been a maritime court ruling in favor of the Philippines, but 
China is not recognizing the decision, and is still asserting its authority over the region.   
 
Philippines 
 America’s history with the Philippines goes back to 1898 when it defeated Spain 
in the Spanish American War. America maintain administrative control over the country 
and established the traditional ties of a colonizer to the country and the population. The 
Japanese occupied it during World War II, and performed a list of war crimes against the 
population and the soldiers who were unable to escape. Their occupation did not last long 
as America took it back by the end of the war. After World War II, the United States 
formed an alliance with the Philippines at the initial bequest from the Philippine 
government. The Quirino administration was a United States upheld government getting 
up to half of its state revenue from American foreign aid. The government also had to 
deal with the HUKs, a left over communist insurgency from World War II that began to 
pursue their goals of turning the Philippines into a communist state. Thus, the Filipino 
government actively worked to court the United States’ support at a discounted rate 
(Goodwin 1997). It was not until the fall of China to the communists that America 
realized the necessity of ensuring its allies in the region to propel its anti-communist 
agenda. The official alliance was signed in 1951.   
 Like NATO, the military commitments between the United States and its allies in 
Asia survived the cold war. The Soviet Union fell, and everyone looked to America to 
see how they were going to act. NATO survived the fall of the Soviet Union, and Like 
NATO, the Philippines alliance also stayed after the original goal for its formation was 
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no longer relevant. From 1992 to 1998 the Philippines was controlled by the Ramos 
administration. This administration took park in the great uncertainty after the conclusion 
of the Cold War. The Soviet Union no longer existed. Vietnam and China were still 
technically communist, but Vietnam had no power projection outside of its own borders, 
and China had already implemented capitalist reforms for more than a decade that 
transformed it from a communist to a quasi-capitalist state. In this decade, the intensity of 
the relationship between the America and the Philippines cooled. America no longer had 
the “evil empire” to contend against, and therefore was more focused on domestic 
politics. The Philippines no longer had an overly powerful ally willing to give anything to 
fight against a foreign threat. The Philippine government just assumed that the American 
military bases were always going to stay because they existed before the Soviet Union 
even existed; however, there was a growing nationalist anti-American sentiment brewing 
in the Philippines that wanted the bases gone (De Castro 2001). This combined with the 
devaluation of security in Asia led to the eventual closure of the military base in the 
Subic Bay (Sanger 1991). 
 In 1995, for the first time, China began to claim its territorial right in the South 
China Sea. The claim originated in the Mischief Reef within the Spratly Island chain 
(Dutton 2011). The Mischief Reef is one of the various islands within the South China 
Sea that has multiple claimants of sovereignty. The initial altercation was a relatively low 
tension affair that was quickly mitigated by Jiang Zemin and the Ramos administration; 
however, it signaled the first time that China was willing to enforce its will onto lesser 
powers over territorial disputes. Directly after this event, The Ramos administration 
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started initiating more talks with the United States, and started receiving loans of military 
naval vessels (De Castro 2001).  
 In 1997, the East Asian Financial Crisis rocked the entire region. When the 
economic reverberations hit the Philippines, the country was also simultaneously hit by 
an El Niño storm. In comparative damage, the Philippines got it off easily when the 
effects of the crisis are evaluated among other affected states. The biggest indicator of 
economic weakness that resulted from the crisis was an increase in poverty, which was 
caused by a combination of higher unemployment from the crisis and the destruction of 
agriculture from the El Niño storm (Khandker & Philippine Institute for Developmental 
Studies & The World Bank Institute 2002). The important part about the financial crisis 
is not necessarily the actual effects of the crisis but the perception and reactions to the 
crisis. During its peak, this economic downturn spread throughout the entire region, and 
there was speculation that the effects would spread throughout the world and cause a 
global recession. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) intervened throughout the 
region giving massive economic loans on the condition of greater economic liberalization 
(Um, Lim, and Hwang 2014). These loans received a backlash in the receiving countries. 
They were criticized for being a new form of imperialism as the IMF only gave the loans 
if their suggestions for a more liberal economy was passed into law. At this point, China 
was also affected in part by the crisis, and it could not project the economic power it has 
today; however, this moment is important because it highlights the mistrust that came 
from these countries about American economic institutions.  
 In 1999, more than a decade after the amendment to the constitution, the mood of 
the Philippine legislature shifted and a new military aid deal from America was presented 
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to the Filipino government; President Estrada, who originally voted against the policy for 
increasing the number of troops being stationed into the country in the first place, passed 
it to the senate who then subsequently passed the deal. Even though this came just two 
years after the Asian Financial crises, this decision was a result of the start of Chinese 
pressure in the Spratly Islands in 1995 in addition to the 1998 resurgence of the Moro 
insurgency. However, this new military deal does not shift the Philippines away from 
more potential relationships with China. It only represents their slight increase in need for 
more defense.  
 In 2001, after the September eleventh terrorist attack, the Philippines was one of 
the first states to join America’s global war on terrorism. The Philippine government 
allowed the United States to post their special forces inside of the country, and to work 
together with the Philippine armed forces to counter the Islamic threat on the southern 
island Mindanao (De Castro 2016). Both states received equally beneficial terms from the 
deal. The American government got a science lab to test the efficacy of its 
counterinsurgency forces by subduing and preventing a possible terrorist cell from grow 
inside the country, and it got to increase the alliance strength after the waning of the 
relationship in the early 1990s. The Philippines received the benefits of working with the 
US military and gaining surplus equipment and training for their armed forces, while also 
receiving help from the US special forces in the three separate insurgent groups that were 
fighting against the government at the time. By 2002, America was providing 50 million 
dollars per year for military assistance (Simon 2013a). 
The Philippines made an additional measured appearance of solidarity after 
September eleven. They sent a noncombatant, humanitarian aid group to Iraq upon the 
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request from America in the volunteer coalition. The force was predominantly medical, 
and worked to provide support to civilians behind the front lines. The force was 
withdrawn by the Philippine government after a member of the force was kidnapped. The 
insurgent group demanded that the Philippine government leave Iraq in exchange for the 
man’s life. There was a measured debate in the Philippines, but President Arroyo 
ultimately decided to withdraw the forces. This withdrawal was done against the behest 
of the US government, and it caused a small rift between the two countries. Almost 
immediately afterwards, president Arroyo set up a meeting with Hu Jintao to promote 
greater levels of cooperation (De Castro 2016).  
 The mid 2000s was the greatest time of cooperation between the Philippines and 
China. At the time, China was using Nye’s soft power approach and trying to garner 
international friendships across the globe. In 2004, China received a visit from the 
Arroyo administration and both states established a strategic partnership in the same year. 
This agreement included putting aside the South China Sea dispute and instead 
cooperating on a joint exploration of marine resources, with a joint signature of the 
Philippines National Oil Company and the Chinese National Offshore Oil Company to 
perform joint seismic studies (Zhao 2012). Earlier, China increased its cooperation with 
the ASEAN states signing a China-ASEAN free trade agreement in 2002. It was looking 
for supporters to be signatories for the trade agreement, and it was actively providing 
benefits to the various ASEAN member states to get it passed. Part of this effort was the 
proposed benefits of greater levels of integration in the region while also providing 
economic support to both partners in the agreement. The agreement was eventually 
passed and was implemented in 2010.   
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 During the election of President Aquino, there was an extended dialogue on both 
sides over the views of America and China in relation to the Philippines. Despite 
America being a long time military ally of the Philippines, there was a prevailing mood 
among both members that the United States was feeding its table scraps to the Philippines 
without offering any true support to propel past its economic challenges. Further, the 
view of America in contrast with China showed that there was an equal level of 
dissatisfaction. The belief was that they were both bullies in their own respective ways 
(Hayton 2014, p.163). There was a growing national sentiment that the political elite of 
the Philippines had sold their country to the United States for personal profit and political 
power. This narrative seemed to be that of a highly political sub-group of the population 
inside the Philippines that was in opposition the current regime because Pew Research 
Center (2014) found that Filipinos were the most pro-American population in the world. 
This popular opinion is then further contrasted with the policy makers in the Philippines. 
The United States is an important ally, but there is a cynicism of Manila’s importance in 
relation to Beijing. China’s relationship is more important to America than Manila’s. 
Their question boils down to, “if there is a conflict between China and the Philippines, 
will America really side with the less valuable Manila?” Between these two attitudes, 
there is a duality of support for America as a country, but there is a realization of the 
realism of American geo-strategic interests in the region and how it values the 
Philippines for those interests. The Philippines is only so valuable to Washington, and the 
Filipino policy makers understand this.   
 With China’s growing power, the state has been actively working to reassert 
control over territory lost. During the Century of Humiliation, which took place roughly 
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between the first Opium War in 1849 and the Chinese Communist Party’s win over the 
nationalist in 1949, China was the victim of just about every major power exploiting it 
through unfair trade treaties and forceful territorial acquisitions. The British, the 
Portuguese, the Soviets, the Americans, and the Japanese all profited at the expense of 
China. As the CCP gained more power, it went looking to regain its lost territories. These 
territorial disputes began with China’s geographic neighbors. China’s claims moved 
outward when it started developing its maritime power (Dutton 2011).  
For most of these disputes, China has used a long and historic legacy to reclaim 
these lost territories. There are Islands in the South China Sea that the Chinese empire has 
historically ruled over. It claims to have the historical legacy over the Senkaku/Diaoyu 
islands as well as the Spratly Islands. The myriad of islands that constitute the Spratly 
Islands are claimed by multiple powers. These include China, Taiwan, Vietnam, France, 
the Philippines, and India. The Chinese claim originates from an ancient Chinese 
document that highlights that there were islands under the control of the Chinese Empire, 
but it falls to controversy as there is a discrepancy to whether the map referred to the 
specific Spratly Islands, or another chain in the Pacific (Erickson 2016).  The first United 
Nations conference on the Law of the Sea was held in 1958. When this convention was 
held when Taiwan, not mainland China, was the representative of China in the United 
Nations. Even though the third round was held in 1982 when the People’s Republic of 
China represented China in the UN, this is still an excuse for China to discount the law as 
illegitimate (Eastin 2013). This further highlights why it has been artificially creating 
islands in the South China Sea. Despite the legitimacy of these islands being recently 
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struck down in the Permanent Court of Arbitration, China boycotts the decision based on 
this fact, while it still holds a de facto control over eighty percent of the Spratly Islands.  
 The Scarborough Shoal is a small shoal within the South China sea that is 200 
kilometers west of the Philippines. Including the lagoon, it has an area of 150 kilometers 
squared, and resides about 6 feet above sea level on high tide. The area around the shoal 
is home to fishing operations traditionally conducted by Filipino fisherman. In addition, 
the Shoal is also used both by Filipino Scientists for oceanographic purposes and as a 
lane for shipping travel. For most of the latter half of the 20th century, the Scarborough 
Shoal has been under control of the Philippines.  
 Starting in 1997 and intermittently thereafter, China has used its warships to 
prevent Philippine Fisherman from using the waters that the Scarborough Shoal would 
normally allow. The Philippines barely has any navy to speak of, and they do not have 
one that could potentially stand up to the People’s Liberation Army navy. For their 
protection, they receive a part of their security from American naval forces in the area; 
however, these American naval forces refuse to directly confront the Chinese military 
vessels so to not provoke a war. The debate on who controls the Shoal will continue for 
the next few decades, and is part of a bigger struggle between China, and the other minor 
powers in the region over who controls the greater Spratly Islands chain.  
On April 8, 2009, China officially asserted its sovereignty over much of the 
disputed territory in the South China Sea. 2012 was home to the intense standoff over the 
Scarborough Shoal that lasted for nearly two months (CNN 2012). On multiple attempts, 
the Philippines tried to send fishing vessels into the region, and the Chinese repeatedly 
repelled them. These actions continued even after strong condemnation from both the 
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United States and Japan. In reaction to these condemnations, as a direct response, a 
wargame exercise between America and the Philippines that included a mock naval 
invasion of China was expedited and carried out on April 16, five days later (Whaley 
2012). The standoff slowly diffused as President Aquino ordered the Philippine coast 
guard to withdraw, while the Chinese administration did the same. No one relinquished 
sovereignty over the islands in the exchange, and China started planting people and 
resources in the area to promote its legal claim of sovereignty. Directly afterwards, the 
President Aquino in his new administration requested military assistance from the United 
States, which it gladly granted (De Castro 2014). This increased military assistance fit the 
Obama administration’s agenda to strengthen their diplomatic relations in Asia for the 
Pivot to Asia.   
In 2013, the Philippines responded by involving the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS) to settle the dispute. This tribunal stems its authority from the 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and settles disputes 
between states based off those provisions. The Philippines challenged China with the 
position that they exercised sovereignty in the exclusive economic zone, while China 
counters that it had historical control over the area through its infamous “nine dash line” 
map. China announced that it would not participate in the convention. On 2016, the 
tribunal ruled that China has no historical right to claim the contested islands, and that the 
Philippines has legitimate sovereignty over the region. Further, the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ruled that China cannot exert its influence over these islands through a 
historical basis (PCA 2016). The Chinese government has rejected this decision and still 
projects a military presence in the region.  
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One of the indications for an oppositional shift of the Philippines back in the favor 
of China revolves around the choice for it joining the Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Bank. The Philippines was one of the founding members of the bank signing on in 2014 
just two years after the Scarborough Shoal standoff. Additionally, this action went 
directly against the wishes of America (Mishra 2016). The Philippines was the rule rather 
than the exception, as nearly every state in the region signed on to the bank as members. 
The total as of 2017 is 57 members across all five continents. The only two countries that 
were invited that currently have no intention of joining are the United States and Japan. 
The Philippines joined, as with most other countries, because there was no inherent 
downside to do so. Money is money, and the more money that the state can get to boost 
its economic potential without any apparent downside is too beneficial of an opportunity 
to reject. The Philippines may understand why the United States is antagonistic towards 
the bank, but its alliance partner lamenting a challenge to its international order -- which 
has a negative reputation in Asia from the financial crisis -- is not a good enough reason 
to not join.  
 The newly elected president of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte has signaled an 
additional shift in relations with the Philippines and both China and the United States. 
Upon election, Duterte has reversed the countries strengthening of US relations that 
began at the beginning of the decade. This correlates with the issues that are more salient 
in domestic Philippines politics. The country has been dealing with domestic instability, 
corruption, poverty, unemployment, and organized crime, and Duterte was elected as a 
response to these problems. As it seems now, money will help support a solution to these 
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problems, and China is letting on that they are willing to give the Philippines more and 
more, while the United States offers criticisms of the Duterte administration.  
Manila has been trying to collect investments from any entity willing to give them 
money. President Duterte has motioned to kick out the U.S. Marines in the southern 
region of the Philippines. At first, this seems like a shift away from the United States, but 
this is not the first time there has been a call against the US military presence in the 
country. In 1987, the Philippine government enacted an amendment to their constitution 
which required the permission from the Philippine senate to allow foreign military troops 
inside its sovereign borders (Park 2011). Duterte originally wanted the counter terrorist 
troops out of Mindanao, and further he has stated his want to remove all American troops 
out by a two-year time table (Denyer 2016). However, Duterte has not followed the 
timeline to implement these demands. In all likelihood, these public displays of 
independence from America correlate with Duterte’s attempted diplomacy with Beijing. 
Through initial negotiations, China has shown its willingness to share access to the 
Spratly Islands with the Philippines, and they have been buying the right to do so. As an 
example, in October 2016, China signed a deal providing 13.5 billion dollars’ worth of 
loans to the Philippines, with another 6 billion in march 2017 (Dumlao-Abadilla & 
Daxim, 2016; Huang 2017). Preliminary numbers for 2017 show that China will become 
the Philippines number one trading partner (Remitio 2017). With the somewhat rocky 
relationship between Duterte and Obama, and the unknown of President Trump, the 
Philippines seems like it is cashing in on the maximum benefit it can gain from China.  
President Duterte said it best when he proclaimed “We cannot go to war because 
we cannot afford it” (Reuters 2017). This highlights the main problem that is presented to 
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the Philippines. It is a poor country, and its domestic issues, and specifically its economy, 
are its chief concern. Throughout its timeline, anytime China started aggressively 
asserting control over Philippine territory, the country strengthened its relationship with 
America. When China cooled off and started looking more benign, Manila relaxed and 
started initiating talks to gain closer support from China. In the late 2000s, the Philippines 
starts working closer with China, until the infamous standoff that causes Manila to fall in 
with Washington. The standoff cools down, and the Philippines works with China and 
their bank by taking billion dollar loans while also kicking out American soldiers. Now 
with the ruling of the ITLOS, and China asserting its claims in the South China Sea 
again, there should be another resurgence of Manila-Washington relations at the expense 
of the Chinese. 
This variation in moods between the two powers in such a short time highlights 
the inconsistent nature of the Philippines and the path it tries to take. It is more than 
willing to work with America on promoting the defense of the state while simultaneously 
working with China to develop its economy. As an important note, the Philippines does 
not necessarily hold a positive view of China and its economic incentives. It does not 
have split personality disorder in positive view ship of these two powers. Instead, it holds 
an opportunistic attitude. It feels uneasy making deals with China to potentially improve 
its own domestic situation (Hongfang 2006). To a point, the Philippines is not wholly 
invested in one partner or the other, but views its relationship between the two in a more 
pessimistic light. In a sense, if China is willing to offer what seems like no strings 
attached loans, the Philippines will cautiously take it. Conversely, it has a longer 
relationship with the United States, and feels more confident in security or economic 
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benefits provided by the United States, but it is not blindsided with love towards America 
either. 
Japan 
 Japan’s relationship with America is opposite to that of the Philippines. It has 
maintained itself as a consistent alliance partner to the United States, and has had one of 
the longest running positive relationships with America since the end of World War II. 
This alliance relationship was not voluntary for Japan at first, but after the country 
regained its sovereignty in 1952, the value for Japan in staying in its relationship with the 
United States was more beneficial than rocking the boat. The United States made the 
same conclusion after the Chinese Communist Party won the Chinese civil war, and 
kicked the nationalist to Taiwan. Japan became the cornerstone of America’s anti-
communist efforts in East Asia. The United States invested an unprecedented level of 
funds into the Japanese economy to help it recover from the trauma of World War II, and 
created a strong ally to counter the new communist threat in Asia.  
 Throughout the formative years after World War II, Japan was a demilitarized 
state. Article 9 of its constitution specifies that Japan cannot maintain an offensive 
military. After the United States officially returned sovereignty back to the country, Japan 
was forced to not have a military. However, due to America’s commitment to the region 
as a military ally against the communist threat, America became more lenient about 
Japan’s military, and promoted them having a “defensive military force.” Japan also had 
the benefit of increased security from America as they were placed right in the center of 
America’s security umbrella in the region. The lion’s share of American military 
installments is shared between Japan and South Korea with the biggest base being held 
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by Japan. The Japanese routinely perform joint military exercises with the American 
Navy, and Japanese admirals have taken overall command of the joint allied forces 
during these exercises.   
 Japan’s economy was the spearhead of the Asian Miracle. This miracle consisted 
of countries who experienced tremendous and consistent economic growth without an 
increase in wealth inequality that normally goes hand in hand. Japan, along with the four 
tigers of Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong, all went from poor, 
developing states to extraordinarily wealthy in the span of two or three decades. In 1988, 
the GDP of Japan surpassed the GDP of the Soviet Union. The growth was so 
phenomenal that it spawned temporary fears in the United States that Japan was going to 
become the next superpower that America would have to contend with. This growth 
stayed consistent until the Asian Financial crises of 1997, which rocked Japan’s boat, but 
the boat did not sink. After the crisis, Japan’s economy grew at a stagnated rate, but it 
was still the second biggest economy in the world up until 2010 when it was surpassed by 
China. However, Japan is still a tremendous economic powerhouse that has an enormous 
effect on a regional and international level economics. 
 Overall, the Japanese have benefited from the combination of a deep and 
extended military alliance with the greatest military power in the world for more than half 
a century. The country also experienced one of the biggest, fastest, and most equal 
economic growth episodes in the history of the world. The alliance between Japan and 
America experienced a deep management that extended through the cold war and 
afterwards as well. The alliance was consistently strengthened by measures from both the 
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United States and Japan, as well as the threatening nature of the Soviet Union and 
communist China.  
When the Cold War ended the alliance between Japan and the United States 
remained in full force. The alliance relationship benefited from a renewed regional threat 
in North Korea, which started heavily building up its defense infrastructure after the fall 
of the Soviet Union. The threat from North Korea multiplied when it was discovered that 
they were building a capacity to make atomic weaponry. From the Soviet Union, to China 
and North Korea, the alliance between Japan and America has always had an external 
threat to cement itself. These threats have only developed further from the failure of 
South Korea’s sunshine policy (in part due to the Bush Administration), as well as 
China’s growing military presence.  
This condition ultimately predicates both how Japan will react to China’s growing 
influence, and America’s supply of stable security as well as how it values one utility 
over the other. The Liberal Democratic Party has kept an iron grip on the Japanese 
Parliament (the Diet) since the government’s formation. This was the party that directed 
the domestic policy of the Japanese government which contributed to the Asian miracle. 
This party has always had a traditional pro-American foreign policy that it has routinely 
promoted within the government. Combine that with the fact that it only lost the majority 
in the Diet during the period of 1993-1994 and the period of 2008-2012, and the alliance 
with America has remained continuous throughout the government’s history.  
 The relationship between Japan and its neighbors is complicated. The 
relationships have deep wounds that never fully healed right, and when the history of its 
actions in the region are brought into the public dialogue, it strikes a nerve for the other 
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states in the region. Japan’s actions as an imperial power has left a long and lasting 
memory, with special attention paid to their actions during World War II. The Japanese 
imperial forces committed war crimes in all its occupied territories. They performed mass 
killings with extra lethal violence, enforced thousands of women into prostitution for the 
army, and conducted horrific and unnecessary scientific experiments on live human 
beings. Unlike the Germans after the war, the Japanese never fully atoned for their 
actions. In 1972 the Japanese and Chinese agreed to a deal which would have the 
Japanese government recognize the People’s Republic of China as the legitimate 
representation of China, while also allowing the Chinese to trade with Japan in exchange 
for dropping the charges of crimes against humanity.  
This recognition deal that the Japanese made with China resulted in the Japanese 
never officially apologizing for their actions in World War II (Zhao 2016). This historical 
wound keeps re-opening because the Japanese both refuse to apologize or take legal 
responsibility for their crimes, and it also fails to teach of its actions in its public-school 
system (Lind 2009). The recurrent textbook controversy then subsequently incites 
nationalistic backlashes in both South Korea and China, and the Chinese government 
subsequently uses these backlashes to strengthen its internal legitimacy by directing 
grievances to outside problems instead of internal domestic problems. This domestic 
signaling then requires the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to act in a confrontational 
matter towards the Japanese for its domestic audience, which then increases the threat 
that the Japanese feel from China (Weiss 2013).  
In 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan beat the Liberal Democratic Party in the 
national Diet. This was the first time in since 1994 that the Liberal Democratic Party lost 
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their majority in the Diet. The DPJ was originally elected in the context of the recession 
with the promise to cut public spending projects and provide tax cuts to Japanese 
households (Tabuchi 2009). The victorious Prime Minister Hatoyama shifted Japanese 
foreign policy to distance itself with Washington to strengthen ties with Beijing (Powell 
2010). He worked towards removing American military bases on Honshu and Okinawa 
wishing to have American troops in Japan only when times of defense necessitated it. He 
was never able to successfully pursue this goal due to pressure from Washington and the 
Obama administration. Through the combined influences of a minority internal backlash 
within the Diet and Washington’s influence, the Hatoyama’s government abandon the 
position as the pressure proved to be too much.  
This was the only time that the Japanese explicitly chose to weaken its military 
alliance for the sake of a stronger relationship with China. The timing of this foreign 
policy shift correlates with the 2008 economic recession. Japan was hit less hard than 
America, but it still experienced a reduction of GDP growth following the initial three 
quarters after the start of the recession. Additionally, China had a buffer from the 
negative effects of the recession, and it was at this point that a narrative began that 
questioned the validity of America’s global economic leadership. This point highlights 
the importance of perception and internal domestic economics and how they affect the 
relationships of these countries. Japan views its economy as weakened with a new 
narrative of Chinese stability among American Instability, and then Japan’s foreign 
policy objectives change to be more China centric. This shift only lasted for two years 
before returning to the American foreign policy, but the small hiccup is an important note 
in this analysis.  
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For Japan’s security, it is heavily under militarized for its economic position in 
the international system. It spends less than one percent of the GDP on its military 
(SIPRI), and Article IX of its constitution restricts it from having any offensive military. 
More recently, Japan has had a slight, but growing, trend towards remilitarization as a 
conservative element in the Liberal Democratic Party has risen to prominence in Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe. This has received domestic backlash, but with the passage of the 
amendment to article 9, a consistent shift in opinions is occurring in the Japanese political 
arena. Part of this buildup has been due to the observed buildup of China’s People’s 
Liberation Army (NIDS 2016). 
It is important to highlight the distinction, that security threats do not just come 
from China. North Korea has developed atomic weaponry as well as the ability to 
delivery those atomic weapons using intercontinental ballistic missiles, which can reach 
Japan. Japan is in a catch-22 of protecting themselves from the perceived threat through a 
system of anti-ballistic missile defense systems readily provided by America. The 
installation of these defenses instills a tremendous amount of fear in the surrounding 
states, which could then spiral out of control in the traditional security dilemma. 
Ultimately, these defense systems might be used for North Korea, but they also can apply 
to Chinese missiles as well. These anti-missile defense systems reduce second strike 
capabilities for oppositional great powers (Powell 1990). Additionally, they can work to 
counter China’s conventional ballistic missiles in the hypothetical situation of 
conventional conflict between the two states. 
In the early 2010s, The Japanese were militarily challenged by the Chinese in the 
East China Sea. This follows a history of territorial acquisition. During the conclusion of 
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the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Japan took control over the current area known as Taiwan 
as well as the Diaoyu islands. The Diaoyu Islands, which were renamed into the Senkaku 
Islands, were part of the general grouping of islands that China lost in the region. When 
America was administrating over Japan post World War II, they relinquished Japan’s 
colonial territories that it took during its imperial reign. The Senkaku islands were 
considered under the administrative control of America through Japan, but control over 
the islands was never solidified by America. China opposes Japanese control because it 
was not party to them, and they claim the islands based off their historic right (Loja 
2016). There is some precedent for territorial acquisition based off historical precedent, 
but there must be some form of sovereignty exertion onto the territory by the state 
proposing control. The biggest complication revolves around the lack of certainty for 
territorial claims. As there is no constitutional authority that dictates to the world how 
territory should be partitioned off, the customs and rules of deciding who rules what is 
not consistent and has evolved from multiple different legal forces (Hayton 2014, p.93). 
When it comes to the control over the islands, both China and Japan have not 
given up their right. The Chinese government is promoting a narrative of regaining its 
rights lost during the century of humiliation, and that narrative has been promoting an 
ardent nationalism across the Chinese population that is especially sensitive to relations 
involving the Japanese (Hughes 2011). Among their territorial disputes, the Chinese have 
been the most contentious towards the Diaoyu islands. Naoto Kan became the newly 
elected prime minister under the Democratic Party in 2010, and his new administration 
saw the first heightened level of tension over the Senkaku Islands. A fishing boat captain 
was arrested by the Japanese coast guard, and the incident spiraled out of control as the it 
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tapped into the national fervor of both countries over who controlled the Senkaku Islands 
(Fackler & Johnson 2010).  
The Japanese proclaim the islands to be theirs, and the Chinese do as well. Part of 
the controversy also comes from the UNCOS provisions for the EEZ as well as the 
continental shelf. For China, the Senkaku Islands lay within their continental shelf, and 
thus with the historical argument, they are the rightful owners of the islands. Japan looks 
at its administrative past, and assumes that the EEZ for the islands is met halfway for the 
Chinese EEZ from their shores. Each state has flown military aircrafts -- at times in 
reaction to one another -- over the island chain to claim as a symbol of their authority. 
The fervent Chinese nationalism in reaction to this dispute has caused a counter 
reactionary movement of growing nationalism in Japan (Kang 2013). In 2013, the issue 
was at the highest point of its tensions. The dispute became a public relations event in 
both countries as the heightening of international tensions caused a backlash in the 
domestic politics of each country, with riots being held against the Japanese population in 
China, and pro-nationalistic parade demonstrations against China being held in Japan. 
This is the point at which Sino-Japanese relationships were at their greatest stress. 
America remained neutral on who officially controls the island, but in de-facto action 
sided with the Japanese. This signals the shift when Japan moves back to strengthening 
its relationship with America. The intensity of this situation has cooled off slightly, but 
Chinese fishing vessels routinely violate the island’s borders, which is still considered to 
be Japanese territory, and Japan still routinely sorties its air force for unidentified flying 
objects over the airspace.  
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Shinzo Abe was re-elected prime minister of Japan in 2012. He is a part of the 
Liberal Democratic Party, and it took control back from the Democratic party. He has 
maintained this position for the last five years. With his rise to power, Japan has shifted 
its intention to increase its spending on its military. This increase of spending 
spearheaded an effort in the Japanese Diet to amend the constitution to allow Japan to 
increase the capacity of the Japanese Self Defense Force as well as changing its role to be 
more offensive in nature. In 2015, Article 9 was not formally amended, but a series of 
laws were passed to allow for a reinterpretation of the article. This reinterpretation would 
allow Japan to use its military in foreign engagements to support its allies. The reason 
being that Japan’s relationship with its allies would weaken if it failed to provide support 
upon the ally’s request (BBC 2015). This introduction did not start with Abe’s 
administration, but it has accelerated its growth. Spending on the Self Defense Force has 
increased (NIDS 2016), and the size and capability restrictions on the war machines used 
by the Japanese military have been surpassed through a combination of loopholes and lax 
oversight by those in charge of regulating the framework.   
Prime minister Abe has been especially proactive in regards to foreign policy. He 
has expanded the normal relations of Japan beyond the big three -- China, the United 
States, and South Korea -- to be more incorporated into Southeast Asia, the European 
Union and NATO. These greater commitments to areas outside the region have 
dovetailed with a tri-pillar foreign policy that deals with the promotion of international 
rule and norms, a guardianship of the international commons, and an effect ally to the 
United States (Przystup 2015). Japan has made its bed with America in it, and that does 
not look like it is going to change anytime in the future.  
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With the introduction of China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
Japan most famously rejected the offer to join at America’s urging. They did this in 
opposition to every other state in the Asian region. This action was one of the strongest 
indicators of Japan’s commitment to the US block in the region. South Korea, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Australia, and allies not even in Asia all opted to join the bank. 
America, however, saw it as a threat to their hegemonic strength in control of the 
international financial institutions, and tried to convince all its allies to boycott the 
membership. Japan is the only state that followed America’s lead. It was invited as 
signatory member, but it refused and has signaled that it currently has no interest in 
joining.  
With the election of Donald Trump, Japan has signaled that it will increase its 
military strength both for its own purposes and at the behest of America. This comes in 
relation to President Trump commenting on America’s possible reduction of military 
spending for its allies in the East, and his wish for Japan to pick up more of the load 
required to protect itself. This is the point that the supply and demand of security comes 
into play. Japan has always had the benefit of readily available security provided by the 
United States. The supply of security is signaled to be dropping, but it is still readily 
available for Japan. Because Japan has had a continuous security threat from the growing 
great power in the region, it is still willing to maintain its security alliance with the 
United States. Further, it being willing to increase its share of the defense cost shows the 
level of value and commitment it has on its relationship with America. Through the post-
Cold War era, Japan has continuously maintained its relationship with the United States.  
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This maintenance and consistency is explained through a combination of Japan’s 
economic strength and exposure to continuous threats. As the theories state, Japan has 
experienced consistent threats to its security and strengthens its relationship to America 
in a reactionary manner. Further, Japan, like every other country, tries to work towards a 
stronger economy; however, its economy is comparatively one of the strongest 
economies in the world. Therefore, the value of economic gains presented to Japan is 
worth less due to its present strength. This economic strength then allows them to 
sacrifice some potential economic benefit to ensure and maintain its security.  
 
Conclusion 
This paper performed an analysis of the alliance behavior between Japan and the 
Philippines towards The United States in relation to China’s growing economic 
capabilities. Using the popular “Two Asias” argument provided in the literature as well as 
the economic theory of alliances, this paper performed a mixed method analysis of the 
research question. A formal model was constructed which highlighted the differences in 
utility for each state between economy and security, and the value that each state derived 
from the security based on their own economic indicators. This model established a 
pattern of how poor states acted differently from rich states. To provide support for the 
pattern established in the model, a critical case comparison was used to analyze the 
actions of Japan and the Philippines in regards to their relationship with American and 
China.  
The conclusion drawn from the analysis shows that there was a consistent pattern 
between the two cases showing that they both strengthened their alliance with the United 
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States when their perception of external threat increased; however, the economic strength 
of Japan provided a buffer that allowed it to maintain its alliance in the face of threat, 
while the economic weakness of the Philippines made the country more willing to risk 
insecurity for greater economic gain. The Philippines was much fickler in its relationship 
between the two powers. This difference was caused, in part, by the state’s developing 
status. On an aggregate, The Philippines finds more value in any form of economic 
stimulus; whereas, Japan has a stronger economy and thus is less willing to sacrifice its 
security for small levels of economic stimulation. When a threatening situation becomes 
partially diffused the Philippines more readily tries to re-evaluate its position between 
China and the United States to gain more benefit for itself while Japan stays consistent in 
its relationship to the United States.  
The hypothesis of this paper was supported by the analysis. This result shows that 
the economic strength of a state matters in Asia when those states must choose how to 
maintain their alliances. The result can be generalized to other cases which are, or have 
been, in similar situations. For further research, there are more cases in Asia that can be 
used to study this phenomenon. Studying the other American allies in Asia will provide a 
more internally valid analysis. More examples would be states like Thailand and South 
Korea. Examples outside of the region are harder to find, but would provide more 
generalizability to the analysis. The Ukraine and its relationship with Russia and the 
European Union would also provide valuable insight into these two oppositional forces. 
Contrastingly, Estonia would provide an alternative to the Ukraine in the rich poor 
dichotomy. In macro IR theory, this paper provides support that alliance maintenance is 
also dependent on the economic conditions of a state, and thus economics should be 
68 
 







Figure 1. Japan Indifference Curve 2000.
 







Figure 4. Philippines Indifference Curve 2000. 
 







Figure 5. Philippines Indifference Curve Pre-Shoal Incident. 
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